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CONTRACTS
Does the Contract Disputes Act Apply
to Contracts Between the National Park Service
and Private Concessioners?
by Ralph C. Anzivino
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 252-257 © 2003 American Bar Association.
Editor's Note: The respondent's brief
in this case was not available by
PREVIEW's deadline.
ISSUE
Does the Contract Disputes Act of
1978 apply to contracts between the
National Park Service and private
concessioners that provide services
and maintain facilities (such as
restaurants, lodges, and gift shops)
in the national parks?
FACTS
In 1916, the National Park Service
was created and was charged with
two basic mandates-one, to con-
serve the scenery, its wildlife, and
its natural and historic objects, and
two, to provide for the public's
enjoyment of these resources. In
creating the National Park Service,
Congress authorized the Secretary
of the Interior to grant privileges,
leases, and permits for the use of
land for the accommodation of visi-
tors to each of the various parks,
monuments, or other reservations
under the secretary's authority.
Congress's charge to provide for the
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enjoyment of the national parks is
understood to require that visitors
be offered various services through-
out the parks. These services are
generally provided in the park's
commercial facilities, such as
lodges, restaurants, and retail out-
lets. The physical facilities are
owned by the federal government.
Throughout its history, the National
Park Service has relied on private
concession contractors to build,
maintain, and operate its visitor-ser-
vice facilities and to provide many
of the other services that the public
typically associates with a national
park, such as outfitter and guide
services. The national parks conces-
sions program has always been a
partnership between the National
Park Service and the concession
contractors to provide access to the
national parks for the enjoyment of
the public.
Between 1916 and 1965, although
Congress had specifically authorized
concession contracting by the
NATioNAL PARK HOSPITALITY
ASSOCIATION v DEPARTMENT OF
THE INTERIOR ET AL.
DOCKET No. 02-196
ARGUMENT DATE:
MARCH 4, 2003
FROM: THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
National Park Service, there was no
specific statutory scheme governing
the relationship between the agency
and its concessioners. In light of the
growing industry and governmental
concern about the National Park
Service's concessions contracting
policies, Congress enacted the
National Park Service Concessions
Policy Act of 1965 to govern conces-
sions contracts. The 1965 act's pri-
mary purpose was to codify conces-
sion policy in order to assure con-
cessioners that their investments
and contract rights enjoyed legal
protection. In 1998, Congress
repealed the 1965 act and passed
a replacement statute, the National
Parks Omnibus Management Act
of 1998.
The 1998 act altered various techni-
cal aspects of the system under
which the National Park Service
enters into private concession con-
tracts. Like the 1965 act before it,
the 1998 act sought to further the
mission of the national park systen
by protecting the parks for the
future while ensuring that the
agency continued to provide the
appropriate accommodations, facili-
ties, and services that are necessary
and appropriate for public use and
enjoyment. 16 U.S.C. § 5951 (b)(1).
In particular, the 1998 act specified
that the National Park Service "shall
utilize concessions contracts to
authorize a person, corporation, or
other entity to provide accommoda-
tions, facilities, and services to visi-
tors to units of the National Park
System." 16 U.S.C. § 5952.
Although the 1998 act expressly
addresses the applicability of certain
statutes, it does not expressly
exempt National Park Service con-
cession contracts from the Contract
Disputes Act (CDA). Subsequently,
the National Park Service issued
regulations implementing the 1998
act. One National Park Service regu-
lation declares that "concession
contracts are not contracts within
the meaning of the Contract
Disputes Act." 36 C.F.R. § 51.3.
In November and December 2000,
the National Park Hospitality
Association, a non-profit trade asso-
ciation that represents many con-
cessioners who do business in the
national parks, and three individual
concessioners filed separate actions
challenging various aspects of the
National Park Service regulations.
Particularly, the petitioners chal-
lenged 36 C.F.R. § 51.3 as being
contrary to the CDA. The cases
were consolidated in the district
court. On May 23, 2001, the district
court granted summary judgment in
National Park Service's favor and
held that the CDA does not apply to
concession contracts. AmFac
Resorts, L.L.C. v. U.S. Department
of Interior, 142 F.Supp. 2d 54
(D.D.C. 2001). The court reasoned
that it was ambiguous whether the
CDA applied to National Park
Service concession contracts. Once
an ambiguity was found, the district
court afforded "Chevron deference"
to the National Park Service, hold-
ing that under the doctrine
announced in Chevron v. Vitional
Resources Defense Council, Inc..
407 U.S. 837 (1984), 36 C.F.R. §
51.3 was a "permissible interpreta-
tion" of the CDA by the National
Park Service.
The District of Columbia Circuit
affirmed the district court, but on a
different basis. AmFac Resorts,
L.L.C. v. U.S. Department of
Interior, 282 F.3d S18 (D.C. Cir.
2002). The court of appeals rea-
soned that the National Park Service
does not administer the Contract
Disputes Act and that therefore it
does not have interpretative author-
tv over its provisions. Accordingly,
the National Park Service was not
entitled to Chevron deference in its
interpretation of the CDA.
Nevertheless, the court of appeals
upheld the agency's determination
that the (DA does not apply to the
National Park Service's concession
contracts. The court reasoned that
the primary purpose of concession
contracts is to permit visitors to
enjoy the national parks in a man-
ner consistent with the preservation
of the parks. The fact that the gov-
ernment receives monetary com-
pensation or incidental benefits
from the concessioners' perfor-
mance is not enough to sweep the
contracts into the ambit of the
Contract Disputes Act. In other
words, the concession contracts do
not fall within the CDA because
their purpose is to benefit the "park
visitors" rather than the govern-
ment. A timely petition for a writ of
certiorari was filed and granted on
November 12, 2002. National Park
HospitalitY.\ssociation v. U.S.
Department of Interior et al., 123
S.Ct. 549 (20)02).
CASE VNALYSIS
The Contract Disputes Act of 1978
provides an alternative forum to
resolve &6vwernment contract dis-
putes. Rather than seeking judicial
relief in the Court of Federal
Claims, a contractor may appeal
decisions by a contracting official to
an administrative board within that
agency. 41 U.S.C. § 607. The board's
decision may then be appealed to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit. Section 3(a) of the
Contract Disputes Act, 41 U.S.C. §
602( a) provides that "unless other-
wise specifically provided herein,
this chapter applies to any express
or implied contract ... entered into
by an executive a ency for (1) the
procurement of property, other than
real property in beint. (2) the pro-
curement of services: (3) the pro-
curement of construction, alter-
ation, repair, or maintenance of real
property; or (4) the disposal of per-
sonal property." The National Park
Se! rvice reculation issued pursuant
t(, the 19-', act expressly states that
( .ontin ed 011 Puc 254)
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concession contracts are not con-
tracts within the meaning of the
Contract Disputes Act. 36 C.F.R. §
51.3. Therefore, the question of
whether the National Park Service
concession contracts fall within
the coverage of the CDA is squarely
presented. A straightforward ques-
tion of statutory interpretation is
at hand.
The petitioners maintain that the
CDA applies to all government con-
tracts, including the National Park
service concession contracts. The
text and history of the Contract
Disputes Act make clear that
Congress intended the statute to be
comprehensive. The act was
designed to end the previous uncer-
taintv about which dispute-resolu-
tion regime would govern any spe-
cific contract dispute by imposing
uniform procedures on virtually
everv O(vernment contract. Thus,
with only a few carefully delineated
exceptions, the CDA covers all dis-
putes between the government and
those with whom it contracts for the
procurement of goods, services, or
the maintenance of real property.
Only by ignoring the CDA's plain
language, and inappropriately creat-
ing new exceptions to the statute,
could it be found that the National
Park Service concession contracts
fall outside the statute's scope.
The CDA by its plain terms applies
to virtually all government contracts
for the procurement of goods or ser-
vices. In this and all statutory con-
struction cases, the Supreme Court
must hegin with the language of the
statute. The first step is to deter-
mine whether the language at issue
has a plain and unambiguous mean-
ing. The inquiry ceases if the statu-
tory languag e is unambiguous and
the statutory scheme is coherent
and consistent. The CDXs plain Ian-
guage applies to any express or
implied contract entered into by
"an executive aency' for "the pro-
eurement of" (1) property, other
than real property in being, (2) ser-
vices, or (3) the construction, alter-
ation, repair, or maintenance of real
property-unless the CDA specifi-
cally provides otherwise. The
National Park Service does not deny
that concessions contracts are "con-
tracts" and that it is an "executive
agency." Nor does it claim that the
CDA itself specifically exempts con-
cession contracts from its coverage.
Thus, since the CDA expressly
applies to procurement contracts,
the National Park Service must con-
vince the Court that concession
contracts are not procurement con-
tracts. The petitioners maintain that
there are a number of significant
problems with this interpretation.
First, the CDA does not limit its
scope to a category of contracts
known as "procurement contracts."
The word "procurement" appears in
the CDA as a noun, rather than as
an adjective describing and limiting
the types of contracts entitled to the
protections of the statute.
Accordingly, the National Park
Service ascribes far too much signif-
icance to the catchphrase "procure-
ment contracts" in its construction
of the statute. Moreover, "procure-
ment" is a broad term. Its dictio-
nary meanin6 is the act of getting or
obtaining something. The CI)A
applies any time an agency con-
tracts to get or obtain any item of
personal property or any service. In
other words, Congress has dictated
that the CDA applies to virtually the
entire gamut of government con-
tracts, unless expressly exempted
hb' statute.
Sceond, the entire scheme of the
CDA confirms the expansive nature
of the term "procurement." In
determining the meaning of a statu-
tory term, a court must look to the
structure and language of the
statute as a whole. The overall
structure of the CDA-and in par-
ticular the narrowness of the statu-
tory exceptions to the CDA's cover-
age-demonstrate the act's broad
applicability to inelude the petition-
ers' contracts. Congress expressly
exempted a few specific categories
of procurement contracts from the
CDA's scope. However, Congress
also mandated that only those
exceptions "specifically provided"
within the CDA could operate to
exclude a contract from the CDA's
dispute-resolution mechanisms. It is
undisputed that none of the statuto-
ry exceptions exempt the National
Park Service concession contracts
from the CDA. Given this statutory
mandate, neither agencies nor
courts have the authority to graft
additional exceptions onto the CDA.
When Congress provides exceptions
in a statute, it follows that courts do
not have the authority to create
others. The proper inference is that
Congress considered the issue of
exceptions and, in the end, limited
the exceptions to those set forth.
Third, consistent with the plain lan-
guaLe and the statutory structure,
the background against which the
CDA was enacted also warrants a
broad and comprehensive reading of
the act's coverage. Before the CDA
was passed, the manner of resolving
government contract disputes had
become exceedingly complex and
unworkable. Each executive agency
was left to its own devices to fashion
a system of dispute resolution. Many
of these systems failed to meet the
needs of either contractors or the
government and frequently gave
agencies far too much authority to
determine the correctness of their
own contract actions.
In November of 1969 Congress
established the Commission of
Government Procurement to pro-
mote the economy, efficiency, and
effectiveness of procurement hb the
executive branch of the federal gov-
ernment. The commission studied
Issue No. 5
all aspects of government procure-
ment and eventually released a four-
volume report that became the basis
of the CDA. The commission found
that patchwork solutions to pro-
curement problems would no longer
suffice and that there was an urgent
need for a unified approach to pro-
curement. In particular, the com-
mission found that contractors
should be afforded direct access to
the courts, which historically have
been the forum for the adjudication
of contract rights and duties.
Congress accepted the commission's
recommendation. In the CDA,
Congress sought to protect a gov-
ernment contractor's right to inde-
pendent review in court. Under the
act, a contractor may bring an
action on a claim directly in the
United States Court of Federal
Claims, notwithstanding any con-
tract provision, regulation, or rule of
law to the contrary. The Senate
Report explained that direct access
to the courts was critical to the fair
resolution of disputes between the
government and its contracting
partners. The Senate Report further
explained that Congress designed
the CDA to have broad application
in order to unify the diverse and
often inconsistent procedures exist-
ing among the many procuring
agencies. It was essential to
Congress's design that all contract
disputes be resolved according to
the same set of procedures. The
petitioners contend that because
two of the critical goals of the CDA
were to protect the right of govern-
ment contractors to seek de novo
review in court and to unify dispute-
resolution mechanisms, the
Supreme Court should not counte-
nance the National Park Service's
attempt to defeat congressional
intent by excepting these conces-
sion contracts from the CDA.
The petitioners believe there are
ample reasons to conclude that the
National Park Service's concession
contracts fall squarely within the
scope of the CDA. First, when the
National Park Service contracts with
concessioners, it plainly procures a
wide range of "services" that have
been sought by the government.
Concessioners provide direct and
indirect services to visitors to the
national parks. For example, the
Grand Canyon concessioner will be
required to run 12 hotels or lodges
that together contain 922 rooms; to
staff and operate nine gift shops; to
operate scheduled bus tours; to pro-
vide locksmithing services; to oper-
ate a laundromat; and to run 10
food-service locations, ranging from
a "Limited Snack Bar" to a
"Gourmet/Fine Dining Restaurant."
These are paradigmatic examples of
"services" and are typical of the
kinds of services that the govern-
ment procures from concessioners,
both large and small, that operate
throughout the national park sys-
tem. It thus seems beyond question
that the National Park Service is
procuring services under this and
other concession contracts that
exist to support visitation to the
national parks.
Second, in many concession con-
tracts, the National Park Service
also procures the "construction,
alteration, repair, or maintenance of
real property." For example, under
the Grand Canyon concessioner's
contract, the concessioner is
required to undertake and complete
an improvement program, including
building apartments for employees,
relocating a maintenance facility,
and renovating a service station, a
watchtower, an auto shop, and a
lodge. The concessioner is required
to perform all of these construction
and maintenance services despite
the fact that the United States
retains title and ownership to all
the concession facilities. Clearly
this activity falls within the scope
of the CDA.
Third, the Department of the
Interior's Board of Contract Appeals
(IBCA) has consistently held that
the National Park Service conces-
sion contracts are procurement con-
tracts subject to the CDA. The IBCA
reasons that the concession con-
tracts are for services that the gov-
ernment itself would otherwise be
required to provide, and there is no
statutory exemption from CDA cov-
erage. Finally, the fact that National
Park Service concession contracts
are subject to the CDA is confirmed
by the fact that many other federal
agencies routinely accept the applic-
ability of the CDA to similar conces-
sion contracts used to procure a
wide range of goods and services.
For example, the CDA has been
applied without challenge to dis-
putes involving concession con-
tracts with the Army and Air Force
Exchange Service, Army Corps of
Engineers, the Navy, and the State
Department. The fact that these
other agencies comply unhesitating-
lv with the CDA is strong evidence
that National Park Service's conces-
sion contracts also fall within the
scope of the statute.
The petitioners further assert that
the reasons offered by the National
Park Service for exempting conces-
sion contracts from the CDA are
unpersuasive. First, the National
Park Service claims that the CDA
does not apply to its concession con-
tracts because under many of these
contracts the government makes no
direct monetary payment to conces-
sioners. The National Park Service's
claim, however, is statutorily irrele-
vant. Unlike various other procure-
ment statutes and regulations, CDA
coverage is not conditioned on the
expenditure of any specified amount
of money. The act applies so long as
the government provides its con-
tracting partner with something of
value in exchange for the procure-
ment of goods or services.
(Continued on Page 256)
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Second, the National Park Service
claims that these contracts are not
subject to the (DA because the pro-
curements benefit the public rather
than the government. (1)A cover-
age, however, does not depend on
whether the benefit of contractual
goods or services is provided to the
government, the public, both, or
neither. There is no textual basis for
this judicially created exception to
the statute. Rather the (CDA on its
face applies to any contract for the
procurement of goods and services,
regardless of who directly benefits
from that procurement. Likewise,
nothing in the background or
legislative history of the CDA sup-
ports the proposition that the act's
applicability turns on subjective
determinations of who may be said
to have benefited from a govern-
ment procurement.
Finally, the National Park Service
claims that, if the CDA governs con-
tracts that benefit both the public
and the government, it is applicable
only to those contracts that the
agency is statutorily required to
provide. However, Congress's deci-
sion not to limit the CDA to con-
tracts that benefit only the govern-
ment rather than the public is per-
fectly sensible. What government
contract for the procurement of
goods or services does not also ben-
efit the public? The CDA does not
remotely support such a parsing of
contracts.
The respondent maintains that the
CDA expressly applies only to .ov-
ernment "procurement contracts"
and that the National Park Service
concession contracts are not "pro-
curement contracts." Therefore, the
National Park Service regulation
stating that concession contracts
are not covered by the CDA is valid.
The respondent asserts two alterna-
tive theories to support the proposi-
tion that the National Park Service
concession contracts are not "pro-
curement contracts."
Its first theory is that the act applies
to any "express or implied contract"
for the "procurement" of property
or services. Federal regulations
define a procurement contract as a
contract by which the government
bargains for, pays for, and receives
goods and services. Concession con-
tracts, however, do not fit that defi-
nition. The function of a concession
contract is not to procure services
or goods.for the ..overme nt.
Rather, concession contracts autho-
rize third parties to provide services
to park visitors. The primary pur-
pose of concession contracts is to
permit visitors to enjoy the national
parks in a manner consistent with
the preservation of the parks. The
fact that the government receives
monetary compensation or inciden-
tal benefits from the concessioners'
performance is not enough to sweep
those contracts into the ambit of
the Contract Disputes Act.
The respondent maintains that this
interpretation is supported by ample
authority. The 1998 act provides
that the National Park Service may
enter into concession contracts to
authorize a person, corporation, or
other entity to provide accommoda-
tions, facilities, and services to visi-
tors to national parks. 16 U.S.C.
5952. The concession contracts
benefit the visitors, not the govern-
ment. The committee reports
accompanying the 199S act also
state that concession contracts do
not constitute contracts for the pro-
curement o)f goods and services for
the benefit of the government. This
is also the position the National
Park Service had consistently main-
tained with respect to concession
contracts under the 1965 act.
Finally, the Court of Federal Claims
has consistently ruled that a conces-
sion contract is not a procurement
but rather is a grant of a permit to
operate a business. The Court of
Claims's rationale is based on the
fact that the government is not
committing to paying out govern-
ment funds or to incurring any
monetary liability.
The respondent's second theory
maintains that the National Park
Service's interpretation of the CDA
is a reasonable interpretation of the
statute and therefore is entitled to
Chevron deference. Once it is deter-
mined that the language in a statute
is reasonably subject to two differ-
ent meanings, courts must give def-
erence to the interpretation of the
administering agency. Chevron v.
Nutional Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 407 U.s. 837 (1984).
The respondent argues that it is
ambiguous whether "concession
contracts" are "procurement con-
tracts" under the CDA.
The respondent believes that the
basic nature of a concession con-
tract is markedly different from that
of a procurement contract. First, in
a concession contract the govern-
ment is not attempting to procure
any chattel or service for itself but
is rather granting another to use
government land as in a license or
lessor/lessee relationship. Second,
when the government procures
something, it assumes the role of
the payor. These concession con-
tracts place the government in the
role of a payee. Therefore, it is
ambiguous whether concession con-
tracts qualify as procurement con-
tracts under the CDA. Under
(Jicron, once it is determined that
statutory language is ambiguous, the
courts must defer to the agency's
interpretation of the statute provid-
ed there is a reasonable basis for
their interpretation.
The respondent offers a number of
reasons that support its interpreta-
Issue No. 52S6
tion that concession contracts are
not procurement contracts. First,
the 1998 act, which is the enabling
law for the National Park Service,
provides that "the Secretary shall
utilize concession contracts to
authorize a person ... to provide
accommodations, facilities, and ser-
vices to visitors to units of the
National Park System." 16 U.S.C. §
5952. In other words, the conces-
sion contracts are authorization
contracts, not procurement con-
tracts. Second, the National Park
Service regulations that implement-
ed the 1965 act expressly stated
that concession contracts are not
procurement contracts. This has
been the long-standing interpreta-
tion by the National Park Service.
And finally, since 1993, the Court of
Federal Claims has consistently held
that concession contracts are not
procurement contracts. Since
Congress is presumed to be aware of
an administrative or judicial inter-
pretation of a statute and to adopt
that interpretation when it enacts a
statute, the National Park Service's
interpretation is entitled to the
Chevron deference. Ergo, the con-
cession contracts are not procure-
ment contracts covered by the CDA.
SIGNIFICANCE
Several interesting issues are raised
by the case. First, the scope of the
Contract Disputes Act will be deter-
mined. Do government concession
contracts qualify as procurement
contracts? If so, thousands of con-
cessioners who provide goods and
services to the government will be
able to use the Contract Disputes
Act. Second, is it ambiguous under
the CDA and the 1998 act whether
concession contracts are procure-
ment contracts? If so, the Chevron
doctrine, which accords deference
to an agency's interpretation of a
statute, will be applicable. And final-
ly, under Chevron, is there a signifi-
cant basis to support the National
Park Service's construction of the
federal statute? The answers to
these questions will be key to clari-
fying the CDA's meaning.
ATTORNEYS FOR THE
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For the National Park Hospitality
Association (Kenneth Steven Geller
(202) 263-3000)
For Department of the Interior et
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American Bar Association 257
